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Abstract 
Over the last few years, many studies have analyzed the productive efficiency of local governments in 
different countries. An accurate definition of their output bundles -i.e., the services and facilities they 
provide to their constituencies- is essential to this research. However, several difficulties emerge in this 
task. First, since in most cases the law only establishes the minimum amount of services and facilities to 
provide, it may well be the case that some municipalities go beyond the legal minimum and, 
consequently, might be labeled as inefficient when compared to other municipalities which stick to the 
legal minimum. Second, municipalities face very different environmental conditions, which raises some 
doubts about the plausibility of an unconditional analysis. This study tackles these problems by 
proposing a metafrontier analysis in which the efficiency of municipalities is evaluated after splitting 
them into clusters according to various criteria (output mix, environmental conditions, size). We 
perform our estimations using order-m frontiers, given their robustness to outliers and immunity to the 
curse of dimensionality. We provide an application to Spanish municipalities, and results show that 
both output mix and, more especially, environmental conditions, should be controlled for, since 
efficiency differences between municipalities in different groups are notable.  
Keywords: efficiency, environmental conditions, local government, metafrontier, order-m 
JEL Classification: D24, D60, H71, H72 
Resumen 
Durante los últimos años muchos trabajos han venido analizando la eficiencia productiva de las 
corporaciones locales de una gran variedad de países. Para este tipo de estudios resulta crucial una 
definición precisa de los servicios e infraestructuras que los municipios proporcionan a sus ciudadanos. 
Sin embargo, esta tarea presenta varias dificultades. En primer lugar, dado que en muchas 
circunstancias la ley únicamente establece los servicios mínimos que debe proporcionar un municipio, 
puede darse el caso de que algunos municipios vayan más allá de este mínimo legal y, 
consecuentemente, sean clasificados como ineficientes al compararlos con otros municipios que se 
ciñen al mínimo. En segundo lugar, las corporaciones locales operan en condiciones ambientales muy 
dispares, lo cual genera dudas acerca de la factibilidad de un análisis incondicional. Este trabajo 
aborda estas cuestiones proponiendo un análisis metafrontera en el que la eficiencia de las 
corporaciones locales se evalúa tras clasificarlas en distintos grupos de acuerdo con criterios múltiples 
(output mix, condiciones ambientales, tamaño). Las estimaciones son llevadas a cabo utilizando 
fronteras orden-m, debido a la robustez que presentan frente a observaciones atípicas y la inmunidad a 
la “maldición de la dimensionalidad” (curse of dimensionality). Llevamos a cabo una aplicación a los 
municipios españoles, y los resultados indican que tanto el output mix como, sobre todo, las 
condiciones ambientales, deberían ser tenidas en cuenta al evaluar la eficiencia, pues las diferencias en 
la eficiencia de los municipios en los distintos grupos son notables. 
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1. Introduction
Over the last few years, a wide range of studies has analyzed the productive efficiency of municipalities
from multiple perspectives. The empirical evidence now available is increasing, and can be divided into
two groups. On the one hand, some studies analyze efficiency in the provision of a specific service such as
refusal collection (Brueckner, 1981; Ruggiero, 1995; Bosch et al., 2000). However, in some countries this
type of study presents certain disadvantages related to the difficulties in assigning the amount of input
usage by each specific service. On the other hand, many studies have considered a global perspective,
taking into account that local governments provide their constituencies with a wide variety of services
and facilities from the municipal budget. The literature is fairly extensive, yet scattered in time—studies
have not emerged abruptly but rather have appeared sporadically over time.1
Therefore, this is a relevant topic whose importance has further increased in the last few years in some
countries. From a viewpoint of European integration and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), it is of
utmost importance that all layers of government manage their resources efficiently, in order to facilitate
and maintain European Economic and Monetary Union. The interest is even higher in certain European
countries such as Spain, where municipalities face tighter budget constraints since the passing of the law
on budget stability (“Ley General de Estabilidad Presupuestaria”, 2001), which establishes mechanisms to
control public debt and public spending in pursuit of a balanced budget.
A shared problem faced by the second category of studies referred to in the first paragraph is the
difficulty to accurately define, and measure, what it is that local governments produce. In most cases the
problems arise due to the impossibility of directly quantifying the supply of public services. The Spanish
case is not free from that criticism, although its magnitude is lessened, largely due to the availability
of data on most of the public services that municipalities are bound to provide, which also includes
information on output quality. However, the law only establishes the minimum services and facilities each
municipality must provide, which varies according to their population. Nothing prevents a particular
municipality from going beyond this legal minimum and providing not only more of each compulsory
service (such as discretionally increasing the area of public parks), but also providing additional services
and facilities whose input usage may be substantial. Such a municipality would be mislabeled as inefficient
when compared to other municipalities which stick to the legal minimum. Therefore, we can consider that
modelling municipalities’ output is difficult; we may even talk about output complexity (Haynes, 2003).
However, what is difficult to measure is the amount of services and facilities provided by each munici-
pality beyond the legal minimum. Some reports acknowledge this reality (see Vilalta and Mas, 2006), but
their results are generally based on surveys carried out on a limited number of municipalities. Previous
studies dealing with this reality are, for instance, Bennett and DiLorenzo (1982), Marlow and Joulfaian
(1989) or Merrifield (1994). According to some of these papers, the additional costs incurred by many
municipalities are quite large, although they also vary a great deal across observations. These studies
1See, for instance, Brueckner and Wingler (1984), Deller (1992), Taylor (1995), De Borger and Kerstens (1996), Grossman
et al. (1999), Hughes and Edwards (2000) and, more recently, Sampaio de Sousa and Stošić (2005) Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007),
or Barankay and Lockwood (2007).
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constitute evidence supporting the hypothesis that some municipalities provide their constituencies with
a larger amount of services and facilities, not only because of different needs in different constituencies,
but also because of the different environmental conditions each municipality faces.
In addition to this, there is a large body of literature on the differing environmental conditions that
DMUs (Decision Making Units) face in different contexts—not only in local government. Since the pio-
neering contributions by Banker and Morey (1986a,b), many studies have analyzed the issue. Most of the
ensuing literature has been of an applied nature (see, for instance Bos and Kool, 2006), although several
theoretical refinements to the initial methodologies have also been proposed (see, for instance Ruggiero,
2004). This body of literature postulates that environmental conditions may have a strong impact on
DMUs’ performance. In the case of municipalities, this would imply that different local governments face
different constituencies in terms of economic and social conditions, to whose needs municipalities may be
more or less responsive irrespective of the amount of services they are obligated to provide. Municipalities
also have different characteristics in terms of geography (including, for instance, rugged terrain, or urban
sprawl); different sectoral production characteristics (in terms of tourism, etc.); and other characteristics.
We consider municipalities may provide more services and facilities than the legally established mini-
mum because of the different environmental conditions they face. Tourist municipalities may face budget
strains due to the highly increased personnel needs they have during their high season. Other municipal-
ities may face higher costs because of urban sprawl. According to Solé-Ollé and Hortas Rico (2008), the
urban spatial structure of many Spanish cities has not only an environmental impact, but also a major im-
pact on municipal finances. In other cases, reasons might be more involved, such as wealthy constituencies
asking for additional services, or rising expenditures on security because of the rapid population increases
experienced by some Spanish cities. As documented by Vilalta and Mas (2006), in a study applied to
a sample of the province of Barcelona, more than 30% of municipal expenditures were discretionary. In
these circumstances, one may reasonably expect that some municipalities will be mislabeled as inefficient
(or, at least, more inefficient than other municipalities) simply because of this wide variety of scenarios.
Therefore, it would be more appropriate to compare only local governments facing similar environmental
conditions.
This study approaches these problems through a two-stage analysis that firstly analyzes the productive
efficiency of municipalities, and secondly divides them into groups according to different classifications.
In the second stage we consider three criteria to classify municipalities into different groups. The first
one considers clusters according to local governments’ output mixes, in order to compare the efficiency of
municipalities with similar output bundles; in this way we can control for the fact that some of them might
provide services and facilities beyond the legal minimum—hence, more complex. The second criterion
constructs groups of municipalities for which we include information on environmental conditions. The
third criterion forms groups according to size, since the levels of services each municipality must provide
hinges on the level of population. In our application to Spanish municipalities, results show that both
output mix and the different environments that municipalities face are issues to control for, since the
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differences between municipalities affiliated to different groups turned out to be statistically significant.
Therefore, in the first stage municipalities are classified into groups according to different criteria given
that, according to the hypotheses formulated, local governments in each group might be facing different
production opportunities. They respond by making choices from different sets of feasible input-output
combinations. These so-called technology sets differ because of differences in available stocks of physical,
human and financial capital (e.g., type of machinery, size and quality of the labor force, access to foreign
exchange), economic infrastructure (e.g., number of ports, access to markets), resource endowments (e.g.,
quality of soils, climate, energy resources) and any other characteristics of the physical, social and economic
environment in which production takes place. As indicated by O’Donnell et al. (2008), such differences
have led efficiency researchers to estimate separate production frontiers for different groups of DMUs.2
However, the literature on efficiency analysis has faced severe problems when dealing with the eval-
uation of DMUs in different groups, which are assumed to have different technologies. Authors such as
Battese and Rao (2002) or Battese et al. (2004) argue that the efficiencies of DMUs that operate under a
given production technology are not comparable with those of DMUs operating under different technolo-
gies. In our setting, this would imply that it is not possible to compare the efficiencies of municipalities
in the different groups formed according to our three criteria. Battese and Rao (2002) propose a solution
based on the concept of metafrontier3 in the context of efficiency measurement using stochastic frontier
analysis (SFA), which refined Battese et al. (2004). In their paper, Battese and Rao (2002) assume there
are two different data-generation mechanisms for the data—one with respect to the stochastic frontier,
the other with respect to the metafrontier model. In contrast, Battese et al. (2004) assume that the
metafrontier function is an overarching function that encompasses the deterministic components of the
stochastic frontier production functions for those DMUs operating under different technologies.
Yet in public sector applications such as the measurement of local government efficiency, most studies
have been using nonparametric techniques such as DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis), or its nonconvex
version (Free Disposable Hull, FDH), for a variety of reasons (Fox, 2001). O’Donnell et al. (2008) have
recently filled this gap in the literature, by extending the metafrontier to DEA and alternative SFA
approaches for estimating both metafrontiers and group frontiers. However, their solutions are not entirely
satisfactory, mainly because of the curse of dimensionality that generally affects efficiency scores obtained
using DEA. As indicated by Daraio and Simar (2007), increasing the number of inputs or outputs, or
decreasing the number of units being compared, leads to higher efficiencies, simply as a result of a statistical
artifact. Multiple applications in disparate fields are affected by this issue (see, among many others Maudos
et al., 2002), which is especially severe in fields such as mutual fund evaluation, where difficulties arise in
defining the number of inputs and outputs (Joro and Na, 2002). Our approach to deal with this problem
is based in the order-m frontier initially proposed by Cazals et al. (2002). We modify their algorithm
2For example, separate frontiers have been estimated for universities in Canada (McMillan and Chan, 2006), Australia
(Worthington and Lee, 2008) and the United Kingdom (Glass et al., 1995), and for bank branches in South Africa (O’Donnell
and Westhuizen, 2002) and Spain (Lovell and Pastor, 1997).
3The metafrontier function was first introduced by Hayami (1969) and Hayami and Ruttan (1970, 1971). As indicated by
these authors (Hayami and Ruttan, 1971, p. 82), “the metaproduction function can be regarded as the envelope of commonly
conceived neoclassical production functions.”
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to control for the existence of municipalities facing different technologies (i.e., municipalities in different
groups), in such a way that the efficiencies found are now comparable because the curse of dimensionality
problem is strongly alleviated. Therefore, we contribute to this growing field of research in which, as
pointed out by Battese et al. (2004) in their conclusions, “further theoretical and applied studies with
other models for technical inefficiency effects are clearly desirable.”
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 and Section 3 provide details on the techniques employed
to both measure efficiency and assess the statistical differences between the efficiencies obtained. Section
4 specifies the particularities of the data employed. Section 5 presents and comments on the most relevant
results, and finally Section 6 summarizes with some concluding remarks.
2. Methodology: efficiency measurement
In the first stage we measure efficiency for all municipalities in our sample, regardless of their different
characteristics. Therefore, we consider a common non-convex Free Disposable Hull (FDH) frontier for all
observations as follows:
min
{αFDHk ,Z1,Z2,...,ZS}
αFDHk ,
s.t. αFDHk TCk −
∑S
s=1 ZsTCs ≥ 0,∑S
s=1 Zsys,i − yk,i ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , I
Zs ∈ {0, 1}, s = 1, . . . , S
(1)
where TCs is total cost for municipality s, s = 1, . . . , S, and ys,i represents the value of its ith output,
i = 1, . . . , I, and Zs denotes the intensity level at which the s observation is conducted.
The FDH methodology is particularly suited to detect the most obvious cases of inefficiency as this
technique is very demanding with regard to inefficiency measurement. For each municipality labeled as
FDH-inefficient, at least one other municipality with superior performance can be found in the sample.
Under some other technological assumptions (e.g., for the convex Data Envelopment Analysis, DEA,
models) it may well be the case that the inefficiency coefficient depends entirely on the assumption of
convexity.
At this point, two aspects of the FDH methodology deserve special attention: efficiency by default and
outliers. In the absence of a sufficient number of similar municipalities for a comparison, a municipality
is labeled as efficient by default. This ranking of efficiency does not result from any effective superiority,
but rather is due to the lack of information that would allow pertinent comparisons. In addition, by
construction, the FDH concept of efficiency applies both to the municipality that presents the lowest level
of spending and to those with the highest values for at least one output indicator. This extreme form of
the sparsity bias that characterizes the FDH technique leads to lack of discrimination among production
units and constitutes a shortcoming of the FDH approach.
As for outliers, by definition nonparametric frontiers are defined by the extreme values of the dimen-
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sional space of inputs and outputs. Thus, the appearance of outliers (atypical observations that differ
significantly from the rest of the data) may considerably influence efficiency computations. It is therefore
necessary to verify that the divergence does not result from evaluation errors. However, once the reliability
of the data set has been confirmed this kind of information may provide valuable information.
Recent work has established the statistical properties of the FDH estimator (Kneip et al., 1998; Simar
and Wilson, 2000) so that inference is now possible either by using asymptotic results or by means of
bootstrap. Simar and Wilson (2000) present a survey on this issue as well as a detailed examination of the
statistical properties of the nonparametric estimators in a multivariate context. Like other nonparametric
measures, FDH estimators suffer from the curse of dimensionality due to their slow convergence rate.
Taken together, the above mentioned problems may be serious enough to jeopardize the FDH estimates.
To solve these problems some additional procedures are required in order to make FDH estimates more
robust. Several approaches have already been proposed in the literature. Wilson (1993, 1995) introduced
descriptive methods to detect influential observations in nonparametric efficiency calculations. More recent
developments include the order-m frontiers (Simar, 2003). The order-m approach, based on the concept
of expected maximal (minimal) output (input or cost) function, yields frontiers of varying degrees of
robustness. The order-m frontiers allow for statistical inference while keeping their nonparametric nature.
We briefly describe this approach below.
Consider a positive fixed integer m. For a given level of input (x0) and output (y0), the estimation
defines the expected value of maximum of m random variables (Y1,. . . ,Ym), drawn from the conditional
distribution of the output matrix Y observing the condition Ym ≥ y0. Formally, the proposed algorithm
(algorithm I) to compute the order-m estimator has the following steps:
1. For a given level of y0, draw a random sample of size m with replacement among those ysm, such
that ysm ≥ y0.
2. Compute Program (1) and estimate α˜s.
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 B times and obtain B efficiency coefficients α˜bs(b = 1, 2, . . . , B). The quality
of the approximation can be tuned by increasing B, but in most applications B = 200 seems to be
a reasonable choice.
4. Compute the empirical mean of B samples as:
αms =
1
B
B∑
b=1
α˜bs (2)
As m increases, the number of observations considered in the estimation approaches the observed units
that meet the condition ysm ≥ y0 and the expected order-m estimator in each one of the b iterations (α˜bs)
tends toward the FDH (αFDHs ). Thus, m is an arbitrary positive integer value, but it is always convenient
to observe the fluctuations of the α˜bs coefficients depending on the level of m. For acceptable values of
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m, αms will normally present values smaller than the unity (this indicates that these units are inefficient,
as total costs can be reduced without modifying the production plan). When αms > 1, the s unit can be
labeled as superefficient, as the order-m frontier exhibits a higher total cost.
As mentioned above, the order-m estimation is an excellent tool to mitigate the problems of dimension-
ality and the presence of extreme observations and outliers. However, this evaluation will be of little use
if part of the inefficiency found hinges on the output complexity or the different environmental conditions
that local governments face, which could lead to biased estimates of the frontier, and hence misleading
policy implications.
Therefore, our objective is to define a process that can estimate the impact on efficiency of output
complexity, environmental conditions and, in general, other options that consider classifying municipalities
in different groups. This estimation is possible following the proposals of Battese et al. (2004) and
O’Donnell et al. (2008) for estimating a metafrontier production function. This process (algorithm II)
contains the following steps:
1. Use cluster analysis to classify the S units in S1, S2, . . . , SC groups.
2. Following the algorithm to estimate the order-m efficiency coefficients, complete steps 1 to 4 of
algorithm I to estimate the efficiency coefficients (αm,S1s ,αm,S2s , . . . ,αm,SCs ) for the municipalities
classified in each one of the clusters S1, S2, . . . , SC . In order to facilitate the cross-comparison of
the results, irrespective of the number of units classified in each cluster, the same value for m will
be assigned in all the estimations. By doing this, the problems of dimensionality and the potential
impact of the outliers will be neutralized.
3. After completing the conditional frontiers in step 2 of algorithm II, apply steps 1 to 4 of the order-
m estimation to the complete sample and estimate the efficiency coefficients with respect to the
metafrontier αms .
4. Estimate the technology gap ratio (TGR) separating the conditional and the metafrontier as the
ratio (αms /αm,S1s ), (αms /αm,S2s ), . . . , (αms /αm,SCs ).
Figure 1 presents an illustration of a simple case with one output and the total cost. At a given output
level, the technology gap ratio (TGR) is defined as the lowest possible cost within the metafrontier divided
by the lowest total cost at the conditional specific cluster.4
3. Testing the closeness between efficiency distributions
Once computation of efficiency scores have been computed there are multiple ways to display and compare
results (El-Mahgary and Lahdelma, 1995). We consider some methods which provide us with more
4We have borrowed the concept of technology gap ratio from Battese and Rao (2002), Battese et al. (2004) and O’Donnell
et al. (2008). They use the term technology because they consider DMUs operating under different technologies. Although
we also talk about different technologies, in order to facilitate comparisons with their papers, we must acknowledge we do
not explicitly test whether the municipalities in the different groups have different technologies. Therefore, when referring to
technology we are only suggesting whether the effect of each hypothesis (output mix or environmental conditions) matters
or not.
7
Figure 1: Metafrontier function model
accurate information (see, for instance Li, 1996; Li et al., 2009). If we based our interpretations on a
number of summary statistics only, we would miss a considerable amount of relevant information. Most
of these methods are based on kernel smoothing to nonparametrically estimate the density functions
corresponding to both αms and αm,SCs indices.5 The kernel density estimator fˆ for a univariate density f
based on a sample of S efficiency indices (either αms or αm,SCs ) is fˆ(x) = (Sh)−1
∑S
s=1K((x − αms )/h),
where s is the municipality index, αms represents its efficiency index, x is the evaluation point, h is the
bandwidth, and K is a kernel function satisfying certain properties. Additional decisions concerned the
kernel and bandwidth choice. For choice of kernel, we considered the Gaussian method for its ease of
computation. Regarding bandwidth selection, the plug-in method suggested by Wand and Jones (1994)
is increasingly adopted in the literature.6
We must control for the fact that efficiency indices are bounded between (0, 1]. The Silverman (1986)-
Schuster (1985) reflection method is based on the idea of “reflecting” the probability mass lying beyond
unity—where, theoretically, no probability mass should exist. The kernel estimate disregarding the bound-
ary condition can be shown to be biased and inconsistent (Simar and Wilson, 1998).7 After estimating
densities, the Li (1996) test shows whether the observed visual differences are statistically significant or
not. The test is based on measuring the distance between densities f(x) and g(x) for which we consider
the mean integrated square error, i.e.:
L = L
(
f(x), g(x)
)
=
∫
x
(
f(x)− g(x))2dx = ∫
x
(
f2(x) + g2(x) − 2f(x)g(x))dx
=
∫
x
(
f(x)dF (x) + g(x)dG(x) − 2g(x)dF (x)) (3)
where F and G are candidates for the distribution of X , with density functions f(x) and g(x) and fˆ is
the nonparametric kernel estimator referred to above. Given that fˆ = (Sh)−1
∑S
s=1K
(
(x− αms )/h
)
, and
gˆ = (Sh)−1
∑S
s=1K
(
(y − αm,SCs )/h
)
then, in practice, an estimator for L is:
L˜ =
∫
x
(
fˆ(x)− gˆ(x))2dx
=
1
S2h
S∑
s=1
S∑
t=1
t"=s
[
K
(αms − αmt
h
)
+K
(αm,SCs − αm,SCt
h
)
−K
(αm,SCs − αmt
h
)
−K
(αms − αm,SCt
h
)]
(4)
The integrated square error is also required for estimating the statistic on which the test is based, the
5Several monographs cover this topic in depth. See, for instance, Silverman (1986), Pagan and Ullah (1999) or, more
recently, Li and Racine (2007).
6It can also be easily accessed, as it is implemented in many software packages such as R.
7Although we used a variety of statistical procedures to perform all computations, the FEAR package by Paul W. Wilson
for the statistical software R provides codes for computing both efficiencies and densities, considering the reflection method.
See http://business.clemson.edu/Economic/faculty/wilson/.
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expression for which is as follows:
T =
Sh1/2L˜
σˆ
(5)
where
σˆ =
1
S2hpi1/2
S∑
t=1
S∑
s=1
[
K
(αms − αmt
h
)
+K
(αm,SCs − αm,SCt
h
)
+ 2K
(αms − αm,SCt
h
)]
(6)
and h is the bandwidth.
The Li (1996) test requires some assumptions to be met such as independently distributed efficiency
scores in each sub-group (and identically within each sub-group). However, order-m efficiency estimates
are dependent in the statistical sense, since perturbations of observations lying on the estimated frontier
will in most cases cause changes in efficiencies estimated for other observations. As indicated by Simar
and Zelenyuk (2006), under these circumstances the Li (1996) test has to be modified in several ways.
First, we must control for the issue of bounded support in order-m density estimation. However, as
demonstrated by Simar and Zelenyuk (2006), although controlling for the boundary effect is important in
density estimation, the statistic based on the reflection method is “essentially the same as the original Li
(1996) test, with the difference being a factor of
√
2 and the fact that the bandwidth used in estimation
of the statistic is obtained from the data with reflection rather than the original data”. Therefore, since
the independency issue is not negligible, we should then follow Simar and Zelenyuk (2006), who provide
a way of adapting the Li (1996) test to the order-m context via bootstrapping techniques to improve its
performance. These authors provide consistent bootstrap estimates of the p-values of the Li (1996) test
as follow:
pˆ =
1
B
B∑
b=1
I{Lˆb > Lˆ}, (7)
where b = 1, . . . , B is the number of bootstrap replicates. The p-values are then adapted to our context,
where the true efficiency scores are replaced by order-m estimates. Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) consider
somewhat ad hoc methods to solve the discontinuity problem generated by the spurious probability mass
at the unity—recall that, by construction, at least one observation will always be on the frontier, and in
most circumstances the number will be quite large. We adopt one of their proposed methods (Algorithm
II; see Simar and Zelenyuk, 2006), based on computing and bootstrapping the Li (1996) statistic using
the sample of order-m estimates where those equal to unity are “smoothed” away from the boundary. We
add a small noise, within, say, 5% of the empirical distribution of αˆms , disregarding those equal to the
unity, but with an order of magnitude smaller than the noise of the estimation. The smoothing procedure
is performed via:
αˆms =
 αˆms + εs, if αˆms = 1;αˆms , otherwise. (8)
where εi = Uniform(0,min{S−2/(I+1+1), a}), a is the α-quantile of the empirical distribution of αˆms
ignoring those equal to the unity.
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4. Data, inputs, and outputs
We perform the analysis for a sample of Spanish municipalities with a population over 1,000 inhabitants for
year 2000. Both input and output data are provided by the Spanish Ministry for Public Administration.
Information on outputs is gathered through the survey on local infrastructures and facilities (Encuesta de
Infraestructuras y Equipamientos Locales), which is performed with 5-year frequency and, consequently,
constrains our sample period. Information on inputs basically consists of different types of costs, and
is taken from local government budgetary data. This data is available for every year. The regions that
meet our criteria (data for year 2000, and data for both inputs and outputs) were Andalusia, Aragon,
Asturias, the Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile-Leon, Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura, Murcia, La
Rioja, and the Valencian Community. The final sample was made up of 1,198 municipalities. There was
no information for the remaining regions for several reasons. At the time of the study, Madrid had not
yet presented information on its outputs. Catalonia, the Basque Country and Navarra do not have to
provide the Spanish Ministry for Public Administration with this information.
Measuring the production process at municipal level is usually more difficult than in other sec-
tors/industries. We can distinguish three stages in this process of transforming inputs into outputs
(Bradford et al., 1969). In the first stage primary inputs (labor, equipment and external services) are
transformed into intermediate outputs (e.g., hours of traffic control or the extension of police services).
In the second stage, intermediate outputs are transformed into direct outputs. This is what Bradford
et al. (1969) call D-outputs, which are ready for consumption by the population. In the third stage, the
direct outputs ultimately have welfare effects on consumers (e.g., increasing perceptions and feelings of
safety and welfare). The third stage of the process can be directly captured by outcome indicators (labeled
C-outputs by Bradford et al., 1969), which reflect the degree to which direct outputs translate into welfare
improvements as perceived by consumers.
The efficiency of municipalities can be measured at each stage of this production process. However,
under normal circumstances this will be difficult because data might be either unavailable or simply poor,
making it difficult to distinguish between primary inputs, intermediate outputs, direct outputs, and final
welfare effects. For this reason the analysis is usually confined to analyzing the first and second phases of
this process, i.e., the links between primary inputs and direct outputs. We base our selection of outputs
on the services and facilities provided by each municipality. All local authorities must provide public
street lighting, cemeteries, waste collection and street cleaning services, drinking water to households,
access to population centers, surfacing of public roads, and regulation of food and drink. In some cases
we must select proxies for these services and facilities. As pointed out by De Borger and Kerstens (1996),
population is assumed to proxy for the various administrative tasks undertaken by municipalities, but it
is clearly not a direct output of local production. Other relevant outputs, such as provision of primary
and secondary education, are not the responsibility of Spanish municipalities.
Spanish law requires municipalities to provide minimum services depending on their size. Some of the
minimum services and facilities must be provided by all municipalities, while others are only binding for
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larger municipalities (with populations of over 5,000, 20,000, and 50,000, the boundaries that define the
different categories). The second column in Table 1 reports information on the minimum services that
each category of municipalities must provide. The third column indicates the selected output indicators
to measure the different services and facilities. Our output choice was driven by the minimum services
and facilities. The list of outputs for year 2000, along with summary statistics, are reported in Table 2.
The choice was also driven by previous studies on local government efficiency in other European countries,
since for the most part they are endowed with the same competencies.8
Selecting inputs is much easier, as it is based on budgetary variables reflecting municipalities’ costs. Our
definition reflects the economic structure of Spanish local government expenditures, details of which are
reported by Spanish legislation,9 that considers three basic categories: current or ordinary expenditures,
capital expenditures, and financial expenditures. Within these, current expenditures are further divided
into four chapters, or categories, which account for: i) personnel expenditure; ii) current goods and
services expenditures; iii) financial expenditures; iv) current transfers. Capital expenditures are also
broken down into either real investments, or capital transfers. The former is what Table 2 refers to as
capital expenditures (X4), i.e., all expenditures local governments implement: i) to produce or acquire
capital goods; ii) to acquire necessary goods to provide local services in the right conditions; or iii) financial
expenditures that are suitable for amortization. On the other hand, capital transfers (X5) refer to the
payments to institutions to finance certain investments. Descriptive statistics for year 2000 are provided
in Table 2. Since our analysis is entirely confined to overall cost efficiency, the fact that some local
government departments may be actually sharing some costs does not raise any particular issue.
We must also select those variables to include when carrying out the cluster analysis for classifying
municipalities into groups according to the different hypotheses. This task is not easy given that we face
certain relevant constraints. First, there is no well-established theory as to which variables constitute the
“environmental conditions” that might impact on each municipality’s cost structure. Second, the available
information is also limited. In a number of contexts the relevance of considering groups is unquestionable.
As indicated by O’Donnell et al. (2008), in most practical settings DMUs can be grouped a priori on
the basis of geographical, economic and/or political boundaries, to name a few.10 However, it is not
entirely clear how groups must be formed. In the absence of “natural” boundaries for the different groups,
multivariate statistical techniques such as cluster analysis are available for determining both the number of
groups and group membership. In our particular setting, the a priori classification or “natural” boundaries
would be those based on size, since the limits of each group are determined by the extent of their powers.
In contrast, we need the cluster analysis technique to classify municipalities according to either output
mix or environmental conditions.
Regarding the classification based on output complexity, the variables selected to construct the groups
8Differences are basically confined to the area of education which, in Spain, corresponds to regional and central govern-
ments.
9See Ministerial Order (Orden Ministerial), September 20th, 1989.
10As also indicated by O’Donnell et al. (2008), if the analysis were conducted in an SFA framework, it would also be
possible to conduct statistical tests concerning the number of groups. El-Gamal and Inanoglu (2005) propose other methods
to circumvent the use of multivariate analysis techniques.
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Table 2: Summary statistics for inputs and outputs, year 2000
Inputsa Mean Std.dev.
Wages and salaries (X1) 6,304.18 9,044.30
Expenditure on goods and services (X2) 4,953.61 7,862.17
Current transfers (X3) 1,072.51 1,748.62
Capital expenditure (X4) 5,905.78 8,513.16
Capital transfers (X5) 276.52 1,031.29
Outputs
Population (Y1) 6,118.54 6,991.48
Number of lighting points (Y2) 1,100.07 1,022.89
Tons of waste collected (Y3) 2,984.87 4,787.84
Street infrastructure surface area (Y4) 256,097.13 261,653.68
Public buildings surface areab(Y5) 599.84 1,198.27
Market surface areab(Y6) 748.21 1,867.12
Registered surface area of public parksb(Y7) 202.44 1,193.32
Assistance centers surface area (Y8) 1,858.22 4,015.22
# of observations 1,198
a In thousands of euros, converted from 1995 pesetas (1 euro=166.386 pese-
tas).
b In square meters.
are similar to those chosen as outputs, dividing them by population. This helps to control for the fact
that, as pointed out in the introduction, some municipalities might go beyond the legal minimum and
provide an amount of services which does not correspond to their size. Therefore, we would only compare
municipalities with similar output mixes, i.e., only those in the same group. We have selected as many
variables to construct the clusters as outputs. The details are reported in Table 3.
Regarding the classification based on environmental conditions, we have chosen some of the variables
provided by the Anuario Estadístico de La Caixa.11 Although they can be partly judged as ad hoc, and
although factors influencing the amount, allocation and distribution of local public spending, we consider
these provide a rough idea of the environmental conditions facing each municipality that might have an
impact on municipal finances. Summary statistics are reported in Table 4, and the particular definition
of each variable considered for performing the cluster analysis follows:
Total surface area: (divided by population). This indicator is similar to density, which is usually defined
as urbanized land per person. Although some authors (Solé-Ollé and Hortas Rico, 2008) consider
it is more appropriate to use urbanized land per person, this variable was not available for all
municipalities in our sample. We consider this is an appropriate proxy for urban sprawl, although
other indicators can be considered (for instance, street surface area divided by total surface (ENV 1).
Tourist index: this index may contribute to rising municipal expenditures, at least during some months
of the year. Comparing these municipalities only with their peers might be more appropriate
(ENV 2).
Economic status: municipalities with wealthier populations might be facing higher types of require-
ments. These constituencies may be willing to pay more taxes but, in return, they will demand
11An annual report provided by the largest Spanish savings bank, La Caixa.
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more services and facilities (ENV 3).
Industrial activities: (divided by population). Municipalities in which industrial activity is high may
be affected by a different, probably higher, cost structure, since this type of activity requires
higher investments in infrastructures, security, anti-pollution policies, etc., which may—although
not necessarily—be offset by higher tax revenues (ENV 4).
Total number of cars: (divided by population). This might be related to ENV 3. Some wealthy con-
stituencies have higher levels of education also (in relative terms) and might have a preference for
non-polluting means of transport (ENV 5).
Unemployment: higher unemployment might entail higher crime and, therefore, increased demands for
security (ENV 6).
Total population growth, 1991–98 (percentage): municipalities facing higher population growthmight
have had to increase the services and facilities at their own expense, because of the speed at which
the population’s demands have increased. If central and regional governments have not reacted
promptly, they might face a sudden imbalance between their revenues and their costs (ENV 7).
Construction: (divided by population). Municipalities where construction was higher have also raised
high tax revenues, which might have led to inefficient management of these increased revenues. In
addition, the population levels in these municipalities might have increased sharply,12 which might
have driven some municipalities to increase their social expenditures, as well as other expenses such
as civil protection, security, etc., some of which are not included in the list of minimum services
municipalities must provide (ENV 8).
Agricultural vehicles/Total number of vehicles (percentage): this information would indicate whether
it is a rural municipality whose needs might differ from others with different sectoral specializations.
It might also be a proxy for urban sprawl (ENV 9).
Number of bank branches: (divided by total population). This would indicate another type of spe-
cialization and, in addition, it might proxy for the economic level of the municipality (ENV 10).
We admit the selection of these variables is somewhat ad hoc. However, we consider they represent a
realistic summary of the different socioeconomic conditions affecting each municipality.
Some decisions involved in performing cluster analysis are the measure of similarity as well as the
clustering method. Regarding the former, one of the most popular choices is the Euclidean square distance.
Regarding the latter, although there are several alternatives, the Ward hierarchial clustering method has
the advantage of maximizing intra-group homogeneity and inter-group heterogeneity. In addition, the
technique is robust to outliers and groups are not too dissimilar in size. However, the criterium that must
12Indeed, the strong increase of population in Spain over the last 10 years has been unevenly distributed across regions,
and it has been especially higher in areas where construction grew more in relative terms.
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Table 5: Order-m efficiencies (metafrontier), summary statistics, year 2000
Group Mean Median Max. Min. Std.dev. % of eff. obs.
All municipalities, metafrontier 0.9118 1.0000 1.4207 0.2344 0.1818 0.3088
Group 1, metafrontier 0.8904 1.0000 1.4207 0.2344 0.2048 0.1068
Group 2, metafrontier 0.9417 1.0000 1.1364 0.3772 0.1343 0.5979
Group 3, metafrontier 0.9787 1.0000 1.0000 0.6376 0.0730 0.9014
ultimately guide the decision on both the methodology and the optimal number of groups is whether the
final groups are sensible in any way, and whether statistical differences exist among group centroids.
Battese et al. (2004) point out the importance of analyzing whether all municipalities share the same
technology. If all municipality-level data were generated from a single production function and the same
underlying technology, there would be no good reason for estimating the efficiency levels of municipalities
relative to a metafrontier. We assume that if statistically significant differences existed among the different
groups, it would constitute evidence in favor of comparing municipalities with those in their group only.
5. Results
Table 5 provides summary statistics on unconditioned efficiency for order-m efficiency scores. Results
are reported for all municipalities, and also for the different size categories, given the differences in their
powers. Results have been obtained by specifying a common frontier—the metafrontier—for all 1,198
observations. Thus, although results are split into different municipality size categories, they correspond
to the same common frontier. The results corresponding to all municipalities, regardless of their powers,
are displayed in the first row. Average efficiency is 91.18%, which is a high value given that municipalities
would become fully efficient if they were able to decrease their total costs by 8.82% only. However, this is an
average effect which varies across municipalities. The values at both tails of the distribution suggest that a
remarkable variety of behaviors exist, since the minimum is 23.44%, whereas the maximum is 142.07%. In
the former case, cost inefficiency is high, whereas the latter refers to cases of super-efficiency—units which
lie beyond the frontier and can be regarded as outliers. This finding is important, since it constitutes a
clear advantage of the order-m frontiers over DEA or FDH, which are strongly affected by the existence
of outliers. In the case of order-m frontiers these extreme observations are labeled as super-efficient and
do not affect the efficiencies found for other observations.
Table 5 also reports order-m efficiencies for the different categories of municipalities split by population
and, consequently, levels of powers. The smallest municipalities in the sample (those with populations
between 1,000 and 5,000) are, on average, the most inefficient. Mean efficiency is 89.04%, close to the
global mean value of 91.18%. These results are partly similar because this is, by and large, the category
with more observations. In contrast, medium sized municipalities (with populations between 5,000 and
20,000) and large municipalities (with populations over 20,000) show higher efficiencies. Not only is
average efficiency higher (94.17% and 97.87%, respectively), but also the number of municipalities lying
18
on the frontier (i.e., fully efficient municipalities) is much higher (59.79% and 90.14%, respectively).13
However, the most interesting results are those obtained for the different clusters, constructed either
using output mix or environmental variables. A description of these clusters is provided in Table 3
(clusters based on output mix) and Table 4 (clusters based on environmental variables). In order to
facilitate interpretations, we provide a lower panel below each table that reports a summary of the variables
included to form the clusters. Regarding the clusters based on output mixes, as reported in Table 3,
differences between the municipalities in each group (in terms of the selected variables) are noteworthy,
even though the size of some of these clusters is remarkable. For instance, group 1 is made up of 300
municipalities, roughly 1/4 of the total sample. Ideally, it would be desirable to have clusters containing
fewer observations to facilitate comparisons. However, some clusters were difficult to split into further
groups, despite considering the Ward method to cluster observations (which tends to form equally-sized
clusters). This is an interesting finding, which would corroborate the fact that many municipalities indeed
do different things, making comparisons misleading.
In some cases, the medians for some clusters and variables differ substantially; this is the case for
cluster 2 in OUTMIX5, cluster 3 in OUTMIX6, cluster 4 in OUTMIX3, cluster 5 in OUTMIX4,
cluster 6 in OUTMIX2 and OUTMIX5, cluster 7 in OUTMIX6, cluster 8 in OUTMIX2, and cluster
9 in OUTMIX5. Therefore, the clusters excel in some particular variables, even taking into account that
some of them contain many observations—compared with the total sample size. In addition, although
there is a wide consensus that the multivariate technique of cluster analysis is flawed, especially because
of the multiple decisions it involves, the MANOVA analysis indicated that the differences between the
identified groups and variables were indeed significant.14
With respect to the clusters based on environmental variables, as indicated in Table 4, the differences
found among them (with respect to the variables included in the analysis) are also noteworthy, and
significant at the 1% level. In this case, differences are more difficult to distinguish, because of the narrow
range of variation for some of these variables (for instance, ENV 2 or ENV 3). However, certain groups
excel in some variables. See, for instance, cluster 3 in ENV 1, cluster 8 in ENV 4, cluster 2 and 6 in
ENV 7, cluster 8 in ENV 8, cluster 7 in ENV 9 or cluster 6 in ENV 10.
It may be claimed that the municipalities in the groups, regardless of the criteria followed to create
them, might be considered to possess different technologies. As indicated in the introduction, Battese
et al. (2004) propose a method for comparing the efficiencies of DMUs in different groups in the context
of Stochastic Frontier Analysis, which has been extended to the DEA context by O’Donnell et al. (2008).
Our methodology, based on order-m indicators, allows us to control for group membership in the context
of efficiency measurement via nonparametric techniques and at the same time, take into account the
severity of the curse of dimensionality. We report the results obtained following our approach in Table 6.
On average—and this result holds for both categories of clusters—municipalities are much closer to their
13For explanations for the different levels of inefficiency found see, for instance, Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007).
14Although, technically, MANOVA compares the means of the groups, not the medians, as reported in Table 3 and Table
4.
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Table 6: Order-m efficiency scores and metatechnology ratios, all municipalities,
summary statistics, year 2000
Group Index Mean Median Max. Min. Std.dev.
Clusters based on
output mix variables
Cluster-specific
efficiencies
0.9910 1.0000 1.9583 0.2425 0.1832
Technology gap 0.9249 0.9996 1.1949 0.3659 0.1343
Clusters based on
environmental
variables
Cluster-specific
efficiencies
0.9892 1.0000 1.5218 0.2493 0.1447
Technology gap 0.9203 0.9895 1.1682 0.2766 0.1264
Clusters based on size Cluster-specificefficiencies
0.9264 1.0000 1.6983 0.2428 0.1807
Technology gap 0.9849 1.0000 1.2117 0.4559 0.0598
frontiers, as documented by average efficiencies closer to unity. This result holds for both clusters based
on output mix variables (99.10%) and clusters based on environmental variables (98.92%). In the case of
clusters based on size, as one might a priori expect, results are quite similar to those of the unconditioned
case (Table 5).
However, Table 6 also reveals that classifying municipalities into different groups does not per se
explain away the remaining efficiencies. The maximum values for the three clustering criteria are well
above the unity, suggesting that a non-negligible number of outliers exist. These are what Andersen and
Petersen (1993) call super-efficient units.15
More specific results are reported in Table 7, Table 8, and Table 9. They report basic summary
statistics of the technology gap ratio, the efficiencies obtained from the group frontiers (CEg), and the
metafrontier (CE∗). In the case of clusters based on output mix, the widest gap between group efficiencies
and metafrontier efficiencies corresponds to municipalities in cluster 2, for which average CEg2 = 1.0508
and average CE∗2 = 0.9071. As a result, the technology gap ratio is the lowest (TGR2 = 0.8776).
In contrast, for cluster 8 the technology gap ratio is the highest (TGR8 = 1.0009) which should be
interpreted inversely, i.e., the efficiencies for municipalities in this group are very similar for the group
frontier (CEg = 1.0006) and metafrontier (CE∗ = 1.0016). In general, although some groups show
remarkable discrepancies between group efficiencies and metafrontier efficiencies (clusters 1 and 2), for
many others the gap is narrower (well above 0.90). Although this result might constitute evidence against
our initial hypothesis, we should bear in mind that clusters 1 and 2 are indeed the largest ones, with 300
and 407 observations included in each of them. Therefore, for more than half of the municipalities in our
sample, it is more reasonable to compare them only with the municipalities in their output mix group.
Table 8 reports analogous information as in Table 7 for clusters constructed using environmental
variables. In this case, supporting evidence for our initial hypothesis is stronger as, on average, the
technology gap ratios are much lower than in Table 7. The widest gap is found for cluster 8, whose
average TGR8 = 0.8718, whereas the lowest gap is found for cluster 3 (TGR3 = 0.9421). However, in this
case the clusters are, on average, much closer to their respective group frontiers than in the case of output
mix clusters—on average, most of them show CEg values in the vicinity of 1. Therefore, regardless of the
15The existence of outliers also partly underlies the remarkably high average values for the efficiency scores.
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Table 7: Order-m efficiencies and metatechnology ratios, clusters based on output mix vari-
ables
Group Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std.Dev. % eff. obs.
Group efficiency, CEg 0.9651 1.0000 0.3222 1.6823 0.1669
Cluster 1 Technology gap ratio 0.9083 0.9678 0.4094 1.0466 0.1266 0.1900
Metafrontier, CE∗ 0.8809 1.0000 0.2672 1.4207 0.2047
Group efficiency, CEg 1.0508 1.0000 0.4205 1.9583 0.2278
Cluster 2 Technology gap ratio 0.8776 0.9529 0.4089 1.0000 0.1489 0.3808
Metafrontier, CE∗ 0.9071 1.0000 0.3772 1.2286 0.1731
Group efficiency, CEg 0.9300 1.0000 0.2944 1.1426 0.1582
Cluster 3 Technology gap ratio 0.9751 1.0000 0.4835 1.0384 0.0870 0.3037
Metafrontier, CE∗ 0.9090 1.0000 0.3049 1.1412 0.1795
Group efficiency, CEg 0.9796 1.0000 0.3445 1.2002 0.1043
Cluster 4 Technology gap ratio 0.9785 1.0051 0.3659 1.1949 0.1272 0.1638
Metafrontier, CE∗ 0.9611 1.0040 0.2710 1.3073 0.1699
Group efficiency, CEg 0.9225 1.0000 0.2425 1.0874 0.1623
Cluster 5 Technology gap ratio 0.9922 1.0006 0.4667 1.1652 0.0908 0.2300
Metafrontier, CE∗ 0.9165 1.0000 0.2536 1.1682 0.1854
Group efficiency, CEg 0.9972 1.0000 0.6334 1.1546 0.0749
Cluster 6 Technology gap ratio 0.9418 1.0000 0.3846 1.0730 0.1252 0.4861
Metafrontier, CE∗ 0.9412 1.0000 0.3923 1.2117 0.1527
Group efficiency, CEg 0.9942 1.0000 0.9207 1.0191 0.0229
Cluster 7 Technology gap ratio 0.9883 1.0000 0.7597 1.0145 0.0494 0.6000
Metafrontier, CE∗ 0.9832 1.0000 0.7076 1.0339 0.0619
Group efficiency, CEg 1.0006 1.0000 1.0000 1.0088 0.0023
Cluster 8 Technology gap ratio 1.0009 1.0000 0.8551 1.1033 0.0502 0.5714
Metafrontier, CE∗ 1.0016 1.0000 0.8551 1.1129 0.0517
Group efficiency, CEg 0.9686 1.0000 0.3371 1.0187 0.1487
Cluster 9 Technology gap ratio 0.9625 1.0000 0.6663 1.1369 0.1215 0.6500
Metafrontier, CE∗ 0.9411 1.0000 0.2344 1.1581 0.1963
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Table 8: Order-m efficiencies and metatechnology ratios, clusters based on environmental
variables
Group Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std.Dev. % eff. obs.
Group efficiency, CEg 1.0008 1.0000 0.3251 1.5098 0.1603
Cluster 1 Technology gap ratio 0.9155 0.9573 0.4106 1.0131 0.1019 0.2297
Metafrontier, CE∗ 0.9183 1.0000 0.2672 1.3073 0.1775
Group efficiency, CEg 0.9923 1.0000 0.5929 1.0813 0.0615
Cluster 2 Technology gap ratio 0.9200 1.0000 0.5185 1.0181 0.1381 0.4630
Metafrontier, CE∗ 0.9144 1.0000 0.4611 1.0503 0.1536
Group efficiency, CEg 0.9895 1.0000 0.4945 1.4171 0.1124
Cluster 3 Technology gap ratio 0.9421 1.0000 0.2766 1.0003 0.1242 0.5833
Metafrontier, CE∗ 0.9326 1.0000 0.2768 1.2117 0.1588
Group efficiency, CEg 0.9811 1.0000 0.2493 1.5218 0.1863
Cluster 4 Technology gap ratio 0.9358 0.9788 0.4822 1.0070 0.0949 0.3284
Metafrontier, CE∗ 0.9176 1.0000 0.2344 1.4207 0.1882
Group efficiency, CEg 1.0022 1.0000 0.4365 1.2965 0.1010
Cluster 5 Technology gap ratio 0.9187 0.9985 0.3577 1.0045 0.1449 0.4231
Metafrontier, CE∗ 0.9209 1.0000 0.3049 1.1232 0.1658
Group efficiency, CEg 0.9557 1.0000 0.3818 1.2284 0.1382
Cluster 6 Technology gap ratio 0.9190 1.0000 0.4005 1.1682 0.1547 0.1361
Metafrontier, CE∗ 0.8805 1.0000 0.3115 1.2286 0.2037
Group efficiency, CEg 0.9987 1.0000 0.8312 1.1401 0.0404
Cluster 7 Technology gap ratio 0.9090 1.0000 0.3203 1.0829 0.1680 0.3944
Metafrontier, CE∗ 0.9095 1.0000 0.3203 1.1193 0.1756
Group efficiency, CEg 0.9655 1.0000 0.3860 1.0712 0.1303
Cluster 8 Technology gap ratio 0.8718 0.9760 0.3092 1.1522 0.1856 0.3182
Metafrontier, CE∗ 0.8476 0.9791 0.3092 1.1568 0.2254
Table 9: Order-m efficiencies and metatechnology ratios, clusters based on size
Group Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std.Dev. % eff. obs.
Group efficiency, CEg 0.9011 1.0000 0.2428 1.6983 0.2008
Cluster 1 Technology gap ratio 0.8972 0.9773 0.3659 1.1949 0.1541 0.1068
Metafrontier, CE∗ 0.8904 1.0000 0.2344 1.4207 0.2048
Group efficiency, CEg 0.9665 1.0000 0.3955 1.6893 0.1388
Cluster 2 Technology gap ratio 0.9683 1.0000 0.5640 1.1364 0.0749 0.5979
Metafrontier, CE∗ 0.9417 1.0000 0.3772 1.1364 0.1343
Group efficiency, CEg 0.9788 1.0000 0.6376 1.0020 0.073
Cluster 3 Technology gap ratio 0.9866 1.0000 0.7564 1.0000 0.0491 0.9014
Metafrontier, CE∗ 0.9787 1.0000 0.6376 1.0000 0.0730
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Table 10: Distribution hypothesis tests (Li, 1996; Simar
and Zelenyuk, 2006)
Efficiency distributions compared t-statistic p-value
Metafrontier vs. output mix clusters 3.4814 0.0002
Metafrontier vs. environmental clusters 7.8215 0.0000
Metafrontier vs. size clusters 2.7929 0.0026
cluster considered, the environmental conditions faced by the different municipalities play a remarkable
role, leading us to mislabel them as inefficient. Note also that the differences found between CEg and
CE∗ are irrespective of the number of observations in each cluster.
Figure 2 shows densities estimated using kernel smoothing of unconditioned and cluster-specific fron-
tiers. The tighter probability mass at unity shows that observations are indeed much closer to those in
their groups than to observations in other groups. These differences are also significant, as indicated by
the p-values in Table 10, which were obtained by applying the Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) test. The
substantial amount of probability mass found at the upper tail of the output mix distribution (Figure 2.a)
indicates that controlling for group membership contributes in a more modest way of explaining efficiency
differentials than in the case of clusters formed using environmental variables.
6. Concluding remarks
Over the last few years, a relevant area of research in the field of public economics and regional science
and urban economics has been the analysis of the efficiency of lower layers of government such as regional
governments or, as it is the case in this study, local governments. The topic is not only relevant per se, but
also because of recent events such as the economic and financial crisis. In some countries such as Spain,
economic activity has stalled, resulting in a sharp reduction of tax revenues and a simultaneous rapid
increase of public spending. Under these circumstances, the efficient management of public resources at
all levels of government becomes even more important.
Among the different levels of government, the literature devoted to the analysis of municipality effi-
ciency is now relatively large. However, although the number of theoretical and applied contributions is
high, there are still some critical issues which remain unsolved. One refers to the definition of municipality
output. This is a thorny question, especially if we take into account that, on the one hand, municipal-
ities face a budget constraint and, on the other, the law requires them to provide a minimum amount
of services and facilities. A related issue is the remarkably varied environmental conditions—in our case
defined as socioeconomic variables—that each municipality faces, which may have a marked effect on their
performance.
We deal with these issues using a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, municipalities are classified
into groups using cluster analysis taking into account variables based on their output mixes and envi-
ronmental conditions. We identify groups of municipalities that share some important features in these
fields, and the differences among them were statistically significant. In the second stage we assess how
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results vary when considering that each municipality should be compared with those in its group rather
than with all municipalities.
The efficiency literature has dealt with the existence of groups and varying environmental conditions
following different criteria. Some authors (Battese and Rao, 2002; Battese et al., 2004; O’Donnell et al.,
2008) have proposed a methodology to compare the decision making units in different groups under the
assumption that technology differs across groups and, therefore, one should estimate both group frontiers
and a metafrontier. We deal with these concepts in the context of the order-m frontiers proposed by
Cazals et al. (2002), in order to tackle relevant problems such as the existence of outliers and the curse of
dimensionality. The severity of these problems, especially the latter, has not been fully acknowledged by
the efficiency literature (Simar and Wilson, 2008, p.441).
Our results indicate that both hypotheses are relevant, especially that referring to the relevance of
different environmental conditions—i.e., it is essential to control for the environment surrounding each
municipality. Although the literature on efficiency had proposed ways to control for them, our methods
are more robust to outliers and alleviate the curse of dimensionality. However, we must admit the groups
constructed, both using output mix and environmental variables, were partly subjective in terms of num-
ber of groups and composition because of the technique employed in their formation—cluster analysis.
Ideally, the research agenda should address how to define groups more objectively when natural boundaries
between them do not exist.
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